
Recovering from violent conflict

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Helping countries recovering from conflict lays the groundwork for development to take off as well as for human security

Cease-fire agreements and peace settlements mark the end of violent conflict, but they do not ensure peace and human security. According to the World Bank, there is a 50-50 chance that renewed violent conflict will erupt, and the chance is even higher when control over natural resources is at stake.¹ Violent conflict causes millions of dollars of damage and destroys societies, often erasing years of development. Recovery requires yet more resources. At the beginning of the 21st century, nearly 60 countries are in conflict or have recently emerged from it, the majority among the poorest.² In many conflicts, the state and its institutions have collapsed, and lingering conflicts rage over control of contested territories.

Helping countries recovering from conflict, one of the most complex challenges confronting the international community, lays the groundwork for development to take off as well as for human security. Conflicts' aftermath affects hundreds of millions of people in numerous ways, and the financial resources required are enormous. The responsibility of states and the international community to protect people in conflict should be complemented by a responsibility to rebuild—including after an international military intervention.³ The measure of an intervention's success is not a military victory—it is the quality of the peace that is left behind. And the benefits of peace must be felt quickly if people are to plan for the future.⁴

Since the 1990s, successive cease-fires and peace settlements have followed the outbreak of violent conflicts. The changing international

environment permitted the negotiation of agreements ending long-term conflict, as in Cambodia and Mozambique. In other situations, the fighting stopped after a cease-fire, but there was no peace to keep, and the conflict resumed after a lull, as in Burundi and Liberia.

International involvement has varied considerably. In Cambodia and Timor-Leste, the United Nations took on de facto administration of the country until elections could be organized. In countries of the former Yugoslavia, deep international involvement has continued many years after the wars ended. In Angola, Liberia and Somalia the involvement of the international community has been patchy—due to lasting insecurity and lack of political will and interest. In many other post-conflict situations, there has been little or no international effort to rebuild the country, as in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The transition from conflict has been approached as a continuous process—from humanitarian relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, leading to development. The presumption has been that only short-term relief is feasible immediately after the conflict ends, and that any efforts at that time towards rehabilitation and reconstruction would likely be wasted. Only when the situation is stable and secure and immediate humanitarian needs have been met can rehabilitation and reconstruction take off, and only after that can development be launched in earnest.

In reality, recovering from violent conflict seldom follows a linear process. Latent conflict lingers, and interpersonal violence and crime may actually increase. Power-sharing arrangements, subject to continual confrontation, are difficult to implement. And massive numbers of people,



Post-conflict situations provide opportunities to recast social, political and economic bases of power

displaced internally and sometimes externally, need to be returned and reintegrated into their communities. Inequalities among communities may sharpen—leading to new grievances. Famine and infectious diseases may spread, causing additional human suffering.⁵

Several initiatives have been launched to overcome the challenges. Closer cooperation is being sought among humanitarian actors, development agencies and financial institutions. Special units have been set up to respond to post-conflict situations, such as the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in the United Nations Development Programme and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has developed donor guidelines on the prevention of violent conflict.⁶

In 1997, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Bank jointly launched the Brookings Process to involve all partners in coordinating and jointly programming activities in a country.⁷ Concentrated on institutional and funding arrangements, its success has been limited. Rather than hand over activities from international relief to international development actors, the goal should be to strengthen the capacities of national and local actors—so that relief, rehabilitation and development assistance can be handed over to them.

Adopting a human security approach

Post-conflict situations provide opportunities to promote change, to fundamentally recast social, political and economic bases of power—opportunities for including the excluded, healing

fragmentation and erasing inequalities. But post-conflict situations can also create new uncertainties and deepen alienation. If human security is to protect and enlarge people's choices by promoting their individual and collective empowerment, their rights to political, social and economic freedoms in post-conflict situations must be reasserted:

- *Political.* The key issue is establishing a new democratic political order, preventing competing social, political and economic forces from causing potentially destabilizing reactions. The institutional capacity and policies of the state are critical to ensuring that grievance is contained and further violence prevented.
- *Social.* Conflict makes poverty and deprivation even worse. Social protection systems and other coping strategies must be built so that people's essential needs and livelihoods are met. The reestablishment of social capital is critical so that divisions can be healed, and trust promoted.
- *Economic.* Recovery from conflict is often related to profound economic adjustments, at the macro- and micro-levels, that create further hardship for some people and communities. Equitable and inclusive economic growth is critical to promoting political and social stability, while enlarging opportunities for people.

Given the linkages, no element of post-conflict transition can be dealt with in isolation. Yet many gaps remain in today's post-crisis strategies (box 4.1). Protecting people and communities requires guaranteeing public safety, providing lifesaving humanitarian relief and essential services and returning and integrating people affected by the conflict. Empowering people

Box 4.1 Gaps in today's post-conflict strategies

From a human security perspective, today's post-conflict strategies have many shortcomings, leaving many gaps:

Security gaps

- Military troops are frequently deployed to separate combatants—troops that are ill-equipped to deal with public security issues, such as civil unrest, crime and the trafficking in people.
- From the outset, emphasis in peacekeeping operations is on pursuing an exit strategy that is not directly related to the security needs of the people.
- Security strategies do not take into account the needs of humanitarian and development actors.

Governance gaps

- Peace-building is seen as a “top-down” process, commonly led and imposed by outside actors—rather than as a process to be owned by national institutions and people.
- Little attention goes to building national and local civil society and communities—or to drawing on their capacities and expertise.
- Organization of national elections receives the most attention (and is often seen as a manoeuvre for handing over international mandates and responsibilities to the newly elected authorities), with little regard for further efforts to support governance and democratization.
- Reconciliation efforts pay too little attention to the coexistence of divided communities and the building of trust.

Gaps in international responses

- The international architecture is segregated along security, humanitarian and development lines, encouraging fragmented and competitive responses.
- International actors tend to focus on mandates—not on presence, comparative advantages and needs of specific situations. Coordination is emphasized, not integration.
- Too little attention goes to building national capacities and institutions, resulting in the absence of national ownership.
- Humanitarian agencies focus on speedy interventions but often fail to consider the impact on reconstruction and development activities. Development actors require long periods to mobilize resources and implement their plans, hampering the conversion of humanitarian activities to longer term development strategies.

Resource gaps

- Assistance tends to peak in the early phases, when the capacity to absorb it is low. It has been difficult to sustain aid over the medium term, just when reconstruction and development take off.
- International actors use many fundraising mechanisms—comprehensive appeals, round-tables, consultative groups and country-specific trust funds—some competing, many raising false expectations about the amounts pledged. Negotiations over debt arrears often delay the full participation of international financial institutions.
- Donors and multilateral agencies separate their budgets into humanitarian and development assistance, making it difficult to transfer funds from one cluster to another.
- Funds are earmarked for specific activities and countries, reflecting the primacy of economic, strategic or political interests over human security needs.



Table 4.1 Key human security clusters following violent conflict

Public safety	Humanitarian relief	Rehabilitation and reconstruction	Reconciliation and coexistence	Governance and empowerment
Control armed elements <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforce cease-fire • Disarm combatants • Demobilize combatants 	Facilitate return of conflict-affected people <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internally displaced persons • Refugees 	Integrate conflict-affected people <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internally displaced persons • Refugees • Armed combatants 	End impunity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Set up tribunals • Involve traditional justice processes 	Establish rule of law framework <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institute constitution, judicial system, legal reform • Adopt legislation • Promote human rights
Protect civilians <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish law and order, fight criminal violence • Clear landmines • Collect small arms 	Assure food security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet nutrition standards • Launch food production 	Rehabilitate infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roads • Housing • Power • Transportation 	Establish truth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Set up truth commission • Promote forgiveness • Restore dignity of victims 	Initiate political reform <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions • Democratic processes
Build national security institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police • Military • Integrate/dissolve non-state armed elements 	Ensure health security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide access to basic health care • Prevent spread of infectious diseases • Provide trauma and mental health care 	Promote social protection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment • Food • Health • Education • Shelter 	Announce amnesties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immunity from prosecution for lesser crimes • Reparation for victims 	Strengthen civil society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation • Accountability • Capacity building
Protect external security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combat illegal weapons and drugs trade • Combat trafficking in people • Control borders 	Establish emergency safety net for people at risk <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women (female-headed households); children (soldiers); elderly; indigenous people; missing people 	Dismantle war economy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fight criminal networks • Re-establish market economy • Provide micro-credit 	Promote coexistence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage community-based initiatives (long-term) • Rebuild social capital 	Promote access to information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independent media • Transparency

Each post-conflict recovery requires an integrated human security framework, developed in full partnership with the national and local authorities

and communities requires building social capital, nurturing the reconciliation and coexistence of divided communities, and restoring governance.

Each post-conflict recovery requires an integrated human security framework, developed in full partnership with the national and local authorities to ensure ownership and commitment to the objectives (table 4.1). The framework should incorporate the human security issues and needs identified under each of five clusters, emphasizing their relationships:

- Ensuring public safety.
- Meeting immediate humanitarian needs.
- Launching rehabilitation and reconstruction.
- Emphasizing reconciliation and coexistence.
- Promoting governance and empowerment.

To the extent possible, all relevant tools and instruments—political, military, humanitarian and developmental—should come under unified leadership, with integration close to the delivery points of assistance. The strength of the United Nations is its active involvement in country and field operations, through which it makes many of its biggest contributions. For each of the five clusters, lead actors should be identified—based on presence and comparative advantage, not just mandated responsibilities. Mandated responsibilities should be interpreted flexibly, in line with people's needs and operational necessities. And partnerships should be established for donors, other multilateral organizations (particularly the World Bank), non-governmental agencies and businesses.

Transition processes also have a deep impact on neighbouring countries and their people. Yet too often, little or no attention goes to wider regional and international dimensions. Because

many human security issues are transnational, the regional consultations on Central Asia—organized by the Commission on Human Security and held in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan—underscored the need for regional cooperation.⁸ In Afghanistan, Kosovo, Rwanda and elsewhere, neighbouring countries have been deeply involved in the conflict and have sought to influence the outcome. That is why it is so important that neighbouring countries be incorporated in the unified strategic framework and support it.

Ensuring public safety

After internal conflict, national authorities are seldom in a position to ensure the security of people. Public safety deteriorates frequently following conflict. While the fighting may have stopped, increased crime rates, revenge killings and reverse ethnic cleansing threaten people's safety in post-conflict situations. And the police and military authorities are often violators of human rights rather than protectors. In addition, inter-personal violence increases, in particular gender-based violence, as families and communities are torn apart and seek to come to terms with the consequences of the violence (see box 2.2 in chapter 2).

The deployment of an international or regional military force contributes significantly towards creating a secure environment (chapter 2). From a human security perspective, such engagement needs to be rethought. Peace settlements focus on the warring parties, not on public safety. The limited deployment of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan to Kabul and its immediate surroundings reveals the shortcomings. A degree of security may have been



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established in the capital, but the rest of the country is largely left to fend for itself. This is detrimental to the security of people, seriously hampering humanitarian and reconstruction projects as well.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society of former combatants and their dependents are critical steps towards human security. Equally critical is the removal of small arms and light weapons and landmines from conflict areas. Without their removal, people are prevented from returning home, and fertile land is left barren. But the demobilization of armed combatants is much more than a political and military step towards peace. Economic opportunities are also required. For many combatants, soldiering is no more and no less than a lucrative job opportunity, a way to escape debilitating poverty.⁹ So demobilization efforts, to be sustainable, should go beyond short-term skills training to include employment opportunities. In addition, emphasis should go to social integration, particularly for child soldiers who have received little or no education. If not, former combatants will turn to crime or join armed groups to earn their livelihood.

But these steps are not adequate for meeting the safety needs of people in post-conflict situations. First, there is a need to gradually shift the focus of international actors from ensuring military security to public safety. Second, the reform of the state security sector must be part of the rehabilitation and governance strategies.

Just after conflict, national and international authorities will focus on military security, separating armed elements, registering and demobilizing combatants, curtailing illicit arms trade, ensuring external security and assisting and

protecting humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts. As the situation stabilizes and military security is maintained, the goals should shift towards upholding public safety through fighting crime (domestic and transnational) and building the capacity of national and local police.

Building on the recommendations in the Brahimi Report, setting up a trained and well-equipped United Nations and other regional civilian standby police forces can be an important step towards enhancing public safety.¹⁰ Crowd control, rather than military deployment or firepower, is more effective for tense situations involving civilians. By emphasizing public safety, police can prevent abuse and corruption among local law and order officials. They can also assist in rebuilding trust and legitimacy in the new national law and order institutions.

The reform, or creation, of the state security sector should be part of the ongoing effort to attain public safety. It is essential not only for wresting control from armed groups and warlords and regaining the monopoly over the legitimate use of armed force, but also for transparency, accountability and democratic control. In Afghanistan, reform of the security sector is foreseen in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001. It provides for integrating all armed groups into official security forces, with the assistance of the international community, building a national army and a national police force and demobilizing civilian militia.¹¹ In addition to reforming the army, police and intelligence services, reform of the security sector needs to be accompanied by changes in the legal system, setting up an independent judiciary and providing services to manage prisons. Reform of the state security sector also implies

Reform of the state security sector should be seen as an integral part of any strategy to strengthen governance and development

getting the income and expenditures of the military, police and other security institutions under control, as a part of efforts to establish a transparent and accountable government, something that has so far received too little attention from donors.¹²

Effective state security institutions upholding the rule of law and human rights are an essential component for achieving human security, development and governance. They are keys to rebuilding trust and confidence in institutions and creating a climate for reducing poverty and attracting investments. Despite the growing attention to the reform of the state security sector, multilateral actors, such as the World Bank, have been reluctant to engage. They see such efforts as interfering in the internal and political affairs of a country.¹³ Far from it, however: reform of the state security sector should be seen as an integral part of any strategy to strengthen governance and development.¹⁴

Meeting immediate humanitarian needs

When the fighting stops and humanitarian actors gain access to the people affected, the immediate requirement is to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, in the form of food, basic health services, shelter and water and sanitation. In the 1990s, much effort went into expanding the capacity to meet people's basic needs. All major multilateral organizations and NGOs have developed an emergency capacity and can respond quickly. The closer working relationships between peacekeeping operations and humanitarian actors have contributed much to mobilizing and delivering life-saving supplies.

But assistance is often compartmentalized for different categories of people—refugees, returnees,

internally displaced persons, demobilized combatants—reflecting the mandates of agencies providing assistance, not overall needs. So little or no attention goes to some groups of people, mainly internally displaced persons and affected host communities. The massive population movements immediately after the fighting ceases often make the humanitarian situation worse. Communicable diseases, such as the cholera outbreak in Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001, spread to other areas as people return home. New arrivals also put added pressure on food rations.

The trauma and psychosocial impact of suffering also go largely unattended.¹⁵ Without professional assistance and traditional coping strategies, people who have undergone traumatic experiences can come to feel a profound sense of shame, hopelessness and mistrust—which can often lead to increased criminal activity and domestic and gender-based violence. In addition to psychological care and counselling, family members and communities need to be reunited, and the missing identified, located and accounted for. Such interventions can help overcome the shame over the violence, help renegotiate understanding of cultural and religious norms and ethics and contribute to coexistence and reconciliation.

In many post-conflict situations, the targets of war and persecution in turn become the victims of peace. It is the responsibility of states to create the conditions for people to return in safety and dignity. Ideally, returns following a peace settlement are voluntary, and people are able to benefit from national protection and opportunities to earn a living. But this is rarely the case. Returns often are abrupt and under pressure. At the first



Multi-actor programmes should be established, integrating repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction

glimmer of peace, people are forced home against their will. Scores of refugees and internally displaced persons are made to settle elsewhere, rather than return home and start their lives again. Nearly 1 million of the 2 million Afghan returnees from refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan have settled in Kabul and other large urban areas. Such sudden and large-scale population influxes strain meagre humanitarian resources and increase tensions.

In post-conflict situations more attention should also go to children and youth, who tend to be forgotten or ignored. In Sierra Leone and the Occupied Palestinian Territories a whole generation of youths knows only violence. If they are to rebuild their community, society and country, investments need to be made in their education, skills, employment and health. But concerted efforts are also needed at the international level.

Launching rehabilitation and reconstruction

The huge economic cost of violent conflict needs to be factored into the reconstruction agenda. In Africa, there is a 2% loss of annual economic growth across the continent as a consequence of violent conflict.¹⁶ In some countries, as much as 40–75% of fiscal and foreign exchange earnings are diverted to fighting a war.¹⁷ Since September 2002, the number of poor in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has tripled to nearly 2 million, or 60% of the population.¹⁸ Unemployment has soared to 53% of the workforce. Despite the desperate situation, the economy continues to function, in part because key essential services and wages are still provided by the authorities—creating a safety net.

During and immediately after conflict, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts should

focus on providing key services, rebuilding basic infrastructure, reintegrating displaced people and demobilized combatants and establishing a social safety net as well as a macroeconomic framework. Such steps permit people to become independent of humanitarian relief. There is growing realization that launching rehabilitation and reconstruction as soon as possible, even when conflict is still ongoing, can be a major incentive for peace. Relief and development activities should work in parallel, with relief gradually phasing out. This calls for much quicker mobilization of reconstruction and development resources and implementation of activities than under the long time frames now required.

Among the key issues is the reintegration of people affected by the conflict, particularly returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Their needs are not systematically incorporated in rehabilitation and reconstruction strategies or development planning (chapter 3). So returning refugees and internally displaced persons pose a large burden, especially in urban centres where they tend to overstretch essential services and assistance and may give rise to higher crime rates. But if the return is properly managed, refugees and internally displaced persons can become an asset in the recovery from conflict rather than a burden.

To overcome these shortcomings, multi-actor programmes should be established, integrating repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.¹⁹ This requires rethinking current working arrangements, such as the compartmentalizing of activities along humanitarian or development lines, and refocusing attention from relief and development actors to national authorities and communities. A people-

Each situation is unique and each society has different ways of achieving justice and reconciling differences

centred strategy views returning refugees and internally displaced persons as resources, not victims. By emphasizing the economic potential of formerly displaced persons and their role in reconstructing, reconciling and governing their country, such an approach makes the reintegration of formerly displaced persons in communities and societies as a whole more feasible.

Land and agricultural reforms are receiving renewed attention in response to pressure from social movements in Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa and Zimbabwe.²⁰ In Rwanda, inheritance and property laws were amended so that women could own the land and property of their husbands killed in the genocide. This has promoted greater gender equality—and prevented countless women and their families from becoming destitute. It has also contributed to food security.

Bringing the conflict economy under control in the immediate post-conflict transition is essential. Conflict expenditures contribute to massive macroeconomic problems. First, there is usually an unsustainable debt burden. Of 49 heavily indebted poor countries, 13 were affected by conflict in 2001.²¹ High interest payments siphon off funds that should go to social spending. Second, there is a tendency to put macroeconomic policy reforms above social reforms, especially social protection objectives, to stabilize economies. Third, this trade-off usually results in declines in education, health, social and infrastructure spending just when people can least bear the social and human costs. Stringent fiscal and economic adjustments during transitions create setbacks for the most vulnerable. The situation is often made worse by criminal networks illegally trading in

natural resources and corrupt officials siphoning off aid monies.

Emphasizing reconciliation and coexistence

Conflict erodes trust in people, communities and government institutions, undermining social cohesion. If these effects are ignored, the result can be radicalized identity politics, manipulation and grievances—which in turn can lead to renewed violence, human rights abuses and conflict.

The relationship between justice and peace is thorny and complex. But more “justice” does not necessarily lead to more “peace”. Today nearly every peace agreement and post-conflict programme includes references to justice and reconciliation, seen as integral to peace-building and governance. But between vengeance and forgiveness lie a broad range of options for coming to terms with the past and building trust.²² Each situation is unique, however, and each society has different ways of achieving justice and reconciling differences.

Justice and reconciliation programmes in post-conflict situations centre on two strategies. The first, relating to the events that occurred in the conflict phase, focuses on establishing the truth of what has happened, upholding justice for the victims and punishing the perpetrators. The second focuses on establishing the rule of law, developing a human rights regime and strengthening judicial systems. In most transitions from conflict to peace, a combination of the two strategies is in place.

Truth and reconciliation commissions have been set up in Argentina, Chad, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. Amnesty legislation—or immunity from



A community-centred approach involving as many people as possible is essential to complement the institution-driven justice and reconciliation processes

prosecution for all or lesser perpetrators of human rights abuses—has been adopted in Chile, Greece, Rwanda, South Africa and Uruguay. International criminal tribunals have been created for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Reparations and compensation have been paid in Germany, Switzerland and Timor-Leste. Common to these processes is the need to:

- Acknowledge and come to terms with what has happened.
- Promote healing and restoration of the dignity of victims as well as communities.
- Punish perpetrators for their crime through confession of guilt, public shame or prosecution.

These are important steps towards peace-building and reconciliation, with great symbolic value. But to be successful and effective requires:

- *Time and commitment.* Neither justice nor reconciliation can be served within short time frames. They require sustained commitment throughout the process.
- *Strong and effective institutions.* To carry out justice, a strong and independent legal system is essential. And institutions must be able to reach out to all people to foster reconciliation.
- *Participation and an agreed framework.* Ownership and legitimacy necessitate people's participation and consultation in designing the process and the objectives.

In countries emerging from conflict, the requirements for an effective justice and reconciliation strategy are seldom present. Institutions are weak or non-existent. Few mechanisms exist to effectively involve people in public policy debates. No effective legal framework functions to administer justice. And justice and reconciliation efforts are often imposed and led by outsiders.

From a human security perspective, a community-centred approach involving as many people as possible is essential to complement the institution-driven justice and reconciliation processes. The challenge is to make sustainable reintegration of people into their communities a realistic option. But this requires a minimal degree of trust and confidence. A first priority is to recognize the legitimacy and dignity of the victims of the conflict and to enable former enemies to interact, even at a minimal level. Restoring trust requires a space for dialogue among people and communities. Encouraging joint activities among the divided communities, through income generation activities and the provision of essential services, can create that space.

Compared with the justice and reconciliation objectives, the goals of coexistence are modest: they focus on creating a dialogue among communities (box 4.2). By engaging in parallel activities, members of conflicting groups build a greater sense of security and respect for others. Through the gradual recognition of increasing economic opportunity and human security, members of different groups can again come to accept one another as participants in society and as interdependent actors. They can begin to imagine themselves living together in peace. In this sense, coexistence bridges vengeance and reconciliation.

Promoting governance and empowerment

The UN Secretary-General has asserted that “good governance at the local, national and international levels is perhaps the single most important factor in promoting development and advancing the cause of peace”.²³ The key issue is how to establish a democratic political order, buttressed by social

Box 4.2 “Imagine Coexistence” projects in Rwanda and Bosnia

“Imagine Coexistence” grew out of the efforts to integrate returning refugees and internally displaced persons into their communities. Except for a meagre food ration and some household utensils, little attention had been given to their effective and sustainable reintegration, thought to be the responsibility of national government actors as part of their “protection” function. Incidents of reverse ethnic cleansing and increasing violence and crime brought to the foreground the need to promote community-based reconciliation strategies.

In 2000, recognizing that reconciliation is a distant goal and that people first need to learn to “coexist” with each other again, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees launched pilot projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, funded through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. The objective was to assess the factors contributing to coexistence between divided communities and to devise strategies for promoting the coexistence dimension in humanitarian projects.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The coexistence projects are implemented through Genesis, a local non-governmental agency that focuses on community needs. The projects concentrate on income generating activities, arts and vocational training. The projects reveal links between coexistence and restitution and compensation for property lost. Tensions and distrust increased if the divisions among the communities were ignored or if the perception existed that one group was favoured over another. Some local authorities opposed the introduction of coexistence projects, demonstrating the importance of

including local authorities in the design as well as the implementation of coexistence projects. Participants felt that the coexistence framework adds an important qualitative dimension to humanitarian and development assistance: a smooth transition from relief to development, preventing further conflict, requires not only a community-based approach, but also involvement of people from different communities.

Rwanda

The projects are developed at the community level and revolve around an economic activity. The projects are implemented through Oxfam (UK) and the Norwegian People’s Aid, which in turn operates with grass-roots associations such as Equipes de Vie, which works with groups of widows and women whose husbands are imprisoned on charges of genocide. Considerable attention is given to creating a local network, which meets regularly with government officials and representatives of multilateral organizations and donor governments. Training in peace education and conflict resolution has been included.

At a regional meeting on coexistence, conflict resolution and human security, participants expressed the belief that projects aimed at promoting coexistence require long-term commitment and need to be integrated into rehabilitation- and development-oriented strategies. Particular attention was drawn to the role of women in bringing communities together, because they tend to be more outspoken and challenge official policies that diminish the human security of the family and community. Finally, participants argued that there was tension between the government’s emphasis on reconciliation and national unity and people’s need to discuss ethnic issues in order to come to terms with the past.



A top priority: establishing institutions that protect people and uphold the rule of law

and economic growth. The process leading to a democratic system is fraught with risks and potential reversals as competing social, political and economic forces vie for control and power. The (short-term) shortfall of policy frameworks, institutional systems and personnel capacity further compound the problems by being unable to contain and prevent grievances.

Among the key governance issues are democratization, participation in decision-making, accountability of decision-makers, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and inclusive, equitable and fair rules and institutions. Governance issues are closely linked to the empowerment of people and communities. Without effective governance, people are not empowered. And unless people and communities are empowered to let their voices be heard or to participate in decision-making, governance is not feasible.

Nearly all peace settlements address governance to varying degrees, but the focus has too often been on short-term stability rather than long-term sustainability. Holding elections and establishing a “legitimate democratic” regime become part of the exit strategy for international actors, rather than a realistic measure of good governance.²⁴ The organization of elections is often the objective—rather than a tool for accountability, participation and good governance.²⁵ Numerous internationally negotiated peace settlements have broken down because of ill-designed democratic institutions, processes and power-sharing arrangements in deeply divided communities. Rather than prevent conflict, such arrangements can fuel tensions if they are perceived as solidifying existing imbalances and inequities along identity lines. That is why many post-conflict countries

have had difficulty consolidating gains and furthering the democratic process.

A top priority: establishing institutions that protect people and uphold the rule of law. To meet the responsibility to protect people, a state must have functioning institutions. In turn, institutions require rules and regulations to operate justly and effectively. This requires promoting the rule of law, to ensure basic rights and freedoms, which in turn form the basis for democratic governance. Given the centrality of the rule of law in the recovery from conflict, both for political governance and for social and economic growth, growing attention is being given to developing specific assistance programmes.

For the first time in 2002, the experiences gained in the various peace operations and in developing comprehensive rule-of-law strategies have been pulled together.²⁶ Establishing the rule of law requires more than drafting a constitution and laws and establishing courts and a judicial system. Most important to include are the norms, principles and practices that establish relations among people and between people and the state. Therefore, establishing or re-establishing the rule of law does not simply imply copying laws and institutions from abroad. Considerable efforts are required to involve people in the process and to be aware of how they understand, use and value law and its institutions.²⁷

Few international actors have the capacity to rapidly deploy civilian law experts, to contribute towards national legislation, institutions and procedures for strengthening the rule of law. Capacity in these areas should be strengthened. Ultimately, good governance depends on people and communities, and this may not come

Greater coherence is required in planning, budgeting and resource mobilization for countries emerging from conflict

spontaneously to them, especially if they have no positive experiences with participation in public life. So civic education should increase people's ownership of the norms, processes and institutions that are fundamental to democratic and well-governed communities and states.

A vibrant civil society provides a mechanism for people to participate, express their views and hold decision-makers accountable. Post-conflict strategies should aim at strengthening civil society by encouraging participation and capacity building, particularly for women's groups, because women face limited participation in formal peace processes and implementation of post-conflict transition strategies. This will also help ensure that gender equality is incorporated in legislative reforms. The accountability and transparency of civil society groups also need to be enhanced—through codes of conduct and a legal framework stipulating rights and obligations.

A new resource mobilization strategy

Pledges of aid help to consolidate peace agreements. The legitimacy and credibility of new leaders often depend on their ability to deliver peace dividends. In practice, it takes too long to translate pledges into commitments and actual disbursements that can be spent flexibly. In many instances, the pledges do not mean additional money, just a repackaging or redirecting of existing funds, to the detriment of people in other countries. Some situations attract considerable funding, others little. Compassion fatigue and donor fatigue set in quickly, especially in the face of sudden downturns (see box 2.3 in chapter 2). In 2002, 16 of the 25 consolidated appeals for humanitarian assistance received less than half of

the requirements, often reflecting strategic, political and economic interests of donors.²⁸

Greater coherence is required in planning, budgeting and resource mobilization for countries emerging from conflict.²⁹ As long as the myriad fund mobilization mechanisms continue to operate in parallel—and resist close coordination and information sharing—the gaps in responses will not be overcome (see box 4.2). There are good examples of improving the process, such as the 1994 Johan Jørgen Holst Peace Fund for channelling donor support for the day to day activities of the Palestinian National Authority. But donors are reluctant to relinquish their prerogative to select and fund projects that receive high levels of domestic support. At the bilateral level, gradual steps are being taken towards more flexible funding mechanisms, exemplified by the transitional budget lines adopted by Denmark and Norway, Japan's Peace Building Grant Aid and the European Union's Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development.

A transition fund focusing on human security should be set up for each post-conflict situation. The fund would finance the activities agreed to under the integrated human security framework, pooling resources for human security-related activities. That would enable financing a broader range of human security issues than is done today, with more attention to activities that are chronically underfunded, such as education, reconciliation and coexistence, reform of the state security sector and the reintegration of internally displaced persons. To allow flexible disbursement, the funds should not be earmarked.

To maintain the confidence of participating donors and beneficiaries, management of such funds should emphasize transparency and accountability.



For human security, peace and development, the multiple gaps in the present strategies need to be overcome

Participation by national authorities is essential for setting priorities and gaining ownership of the process. To the extent possible, other parties to conflict should be included, to ensure the equitably sharing of the benefits of peace.

Policy conclusions

Implementing a human security approach in post-conflict transition requires significant changes in the way donors, multilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations and national authorities pursue their goals—at both micro and macro levels. For human security, peace and development to be achieved, the multiple gaps in the present strategies need to be overcome:

- All actors should recognize the responsibility to rebuild in post-conflict situations.
- People's safety should be assured by focusing on public safety.
- Life-saving humanitarian assistance should be provided, safety nets set up for people most at risk and rehabilitation and reconstruction activities launched to rebuild infrastructure and create the conditions for economic activities to take off.
- Conditions for democratic governance need to be created by empowering people, emphasizing reconciliation, coexistence and rule of law.
- The international community should develop a human security framework and set up a human security transition fund for each recovery from post-conflict, in full partnership with national actors.

Notes

1. "World Bank Study Says 50-50 Chance of Failure," *The Washington Post*, 26 November 2002.

2. Chapter 5 discusses the protection of people following an economic downturn and natural disasters.
3. ICISS 2001, pp. 39–46.
4. Ogata 2003.
5. Dreze and Sen 1989.
6. OECD 2001.
7. Ogata and Wolfensohn 1999.
8. www.humansecurity-chs.org
9. Sen 2001.
10. United Nations 2000.
11. In post-conflict Afghanistan, France and the United States are responsible for rebuilding the national army. Germany is training the police. The United Kingdom is overseeing the anti-narcotics trade. Japan is leading the demobilization and registration of former combatants.
12. Bal 2002.
13. Coletta 2002.
14. UNDP 2002, pp. 83–100.
15. Leaning, Arie and Holleufer 2002.
16. DFID, 2001.
17. Green, 1994, p. 48.
18. World Bank 2003.
19. Also known as the 4Rs. UNHCR has launched an initiative, in cooperation with United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, towards overcoming the gaps between relief and development. Pilot projects are underway in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.
20. FAO 2002.
21. DFID 2001.
22. Minow 1998.
23. United Nations, General Assembly 2002, p. 11.
24. Dennis McNamara, "The UN has been learning how it's done." Op-Ed, *International Herald Tribune*, 29 October 2002.

25. Paddy Ashdown, "What I Learned in Bosnia." Op-Ed, *New York Times*, October 28, 2002.
26. An interdepartmental task force was established in April 2002 by the Committee on Peace and Security following a recommendation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
27. Carothers 2003.
28. United Nations 2002.
29. United Nations, General Assembly 2002.

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